Expediency, legitimacy, and the rule of law: a systems perspective on civil/criminal procedural hybrids by Hendry, Jennifer & King, Colin
ORI GIN AL PA PER
Expediency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law: A Systems
Perspective on Civil/Criminal Procedural Hybrids
Jennifer Hendry1 • Colin King2
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In recent years an increasing quantity of UK legislation has introduced blended
or ‘hybridised’ procedures that blur the previously clear demarcation between civil and
criminal legal processes, typically on the grounds of normatively-motivated political
expediency. This paper provides a critical perspective on instances of procedural
hybridisation in order to illustrate that, first, the reliance upon civil law measures to remedy
criminal law infractions can raise human rights issues and, second, that such instrumental
criminal justice strategies deliberately circumvent the enhanced procedural protections of
the criminal law. By conceptualising the rule of law as a structural coupling between the
political and legal systems, and due process rights as necessary and self-imposed limita-
tions upon systemic operations, this paper employs a systems-theoretical approach to
critique this balancing act between expediency and principle, and queries the circum-
stances under which legislation contravening the rule of law can be said to lack legitimacy.
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And that is exactly why the legitimacy of law is questioned time and again—acutely or hopelessly, out of
frustration or anger, full of value-perspectives that are beside the point for law.
Niklas Luhmann (2004: 261)
No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden…
Our democratic system of government exists in this Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency.
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1 Introduction
There has been a marked increase in recent years in the quantity of legislation passed by
the UK Parliament that provides for hybridised procedural approaches to specific legal
issues. By ‘hybridised’ procedures, we mean those blended processes in either civil or
criminal law that rely upon mechanisms normally associated with the other type, or those
that omit procedural dimensions normally required by their own sort, and thus blur the
lines between the civil and the criminal.1 Many examples can be cited of the use of civil
processes to target criminal behaviour, for example, in relation to anti-social behaviour
(e.g., Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1,
recently replaced by the Injunction under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and
Policing Act 20142), domestic violence (e.g., Domestic Violence Protection Notices
(DVPNs) and Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs) under the Crime and
Security Act 2010, ss. 24–29), forced marriage (e.g., Forced Marriage Protection Orders, as
inserted in the Family Law Act 1996 by the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007),
sexual offences (e.g., Sexual Harm Prevention Orders and Sexual Risk Orders introduced
under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, replacing other civil orders
under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), serious/organised crime (e.g., Serious Crime
Prevention Orders under Part 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 and Civil Recovery Orders
under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002), and terrorism (e.g., Control
Orders introduced under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, then abolished in 2012 and
replaced by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMS)).
The reasons for this increasing procedural hybridisation are themselves context-specific
and thus variable, but one common aspect across each of the illustrations listed above is a
degree of normatively motivated political expediency. Control orders were initially con-
ceived of as hybrid administrative measures with a starring role in the ‘War on Terror,’ for
example, while the hybrid nature of DVPOs results from the policy goal of combating
more effectively domestic violence against women and girls, their conception as expressly
protective, not punitive. This value-based approach can also be seen in terms of civil
recovery, the policy position behind which is that crime should not pay, and that assets
arising from criminal activity ought to be forfeited. The inherent instrumentality behind the
introduction of each of these hybrid measures is overt, although not in itself problematic.
What is concerning, however, is the manner in which such legislative privileging of
expediency over considerations of human rights and due process is becoming increasingly
normalised.3
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the rising frequency of such procedural
hybridisation (see Ashworth and Zedner 2008: 29–31), and to demonstrate that hybrid
orders illegitimately circumvent criminal law procedural protections.4 We employ a sys-
tems-theoretical approach to critique what, we argue, is a prioritisation of expediency over
1 For the purpose of this analysis, a ‘hybrid’ process is defined as one that contains characteristics of two
previous discrete legal categories: see, for example, Bronitt and Donkin (2012).
2 There are provisions for other civil measures post-conviction—for example, ‘CRASBOs’ (Criminal Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders) were replaced by Criminal Behaviour Orders under the Anti-social Behaviour,
Crime and Policing Act 2014. Another example of post-conviction civil powers is the power to grant
Restraining Orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s. 5.
3 As Zedner (2007: 203) notes, ‘Security of the individual from the state rests in adherence to the rule of law
and yet the security of living under the rule of law has no meaning if laws themselves do not abide by its
basic precepts’.
4 Our focus in this paper is on the use of civil processes to tackle behaviour that is essentially ‘criminal’.
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principle, and engage with the following fundamental question: can a legislative provision,
properly passed according to the requirements and procedures of the enacting Parliament
but which contravenes those higher legal principles comprising the rule of law, lack
legitimacy? These issues are scrutinised in terms of the rule of law, which we conceptu-
alise not only as a composite of legal standards, normative aspirations, and quality
benchmarks but also as a structural coupling between the political and legal systems; we
rely upon this insight to analyse the introduction of these hybrid orders and procedures.
Our conclusion will be that, in spite of their undisputed legal validity, their effective
circumvention of rule of law standards places them squarely in a position of questionable
legitimacy. The first section of this paper will articulate what we understand by ‘legiti-
macy’ in this context, with specific discussion of this composite group of ‘rule of law’
standards in systems-theoretical terms, while the second will provide a comprehensive
analysis of civil/criminal procedural hybridisation, and will present our case study of civil
recovery. The third section will reintroduce the core question and argue the thesis that, in
spite of their undisputed legal validity, such hybridised measures lack legitimacy because
they exceed both the legal system’s self-imposed limitations and those resulting from its
structural couplings5 with the political system. Our conclusion presents the increasing
reliance on procedurally hybrid approaches as an over-emphasis upon expediency at the
expense of principle.
It should be noted here that this paper employs a systems-theoretical perspective in
leading its principal argument. This perspective provides a fresh insight into both ongoing
debates on procedural hybrids (see, e.g., Bronitt and Donkin 2012; Zedner 2007) and legal-
theoretical discussions of the rule of law. The advantages of a systems perspective on
procedural hybridisation lie in how the theory’s emphasis on functional differentiation and
the boundaries between systemic operations highlights issues often left unseen by con-
ventional analyses. Systems theory draws clear dividing lines between the concepts at the
heart of this analysis—validity and legitimacy, the legal and the political—and this clarity
provides an invaluable foundation for critique. This study also contributes usefully to the
further development of systems theory itself, as the issues raised by considering procedural
hybrids test both its positivistic6 and descriptive nature, not least by presenting it with the
obstacle of normativity. Indeed, it is with normativity that we will begin, for it is in terms
of two specific normative dimensions that this analysis establishes its parameters relative to
the competing concepts of expediency and principle. These normative dimensions can be
articulated in terms of our selected case study, namely civil recovery under POCA 2002
Part 5. Civil recovery under POCA perfectly illustrates the contentious nature of civil/
criminal hybrid procedures in that civil recovery allows the State to go after ‘criminal’
proceeds albeit by circumventing enhanced procedural protections of the criminal process.7
5 In what is a highly selective contact between systems, structural coupling is the ‘form in which the system
presupposes specific states or changes in its environment and relies upon them’ (Luhmann 1992: 1432). The
terminology, structure, and detail of autopoietic systems theory are discussed below.
6 As Ewald (1988: 39) states, autopoiesis is ‘indisputably the daughter of Kelsen’s Pure Theory.’ Siltala
(2000: 205) echoes this by observing that ‘the theory of legal autopoiesis… defines the concept of law in
essentially circular and self-referential terms under the normativistic and methodological premises of
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’. See also Kelsen (1967).
7 We deliberately select civil recovery as our case study, not least because there is already an extensive
literature on other hybrid procedures such as ASBOs, control orders, sexual prevention orders, etc.: see
Ashworth and Zedner (2014, 2008); Walker (2013); Hoffman and MacDonald (2010); Shute (2004).
Another reason for this choice is that the literature tends to focus on those hybrid orders that carry a threat of
imprisonment for breach of the civil order. There is no threat of imprisonment with civil recovery under
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The first normative dimension to consider, as mentioned above, is the value-based
motivation behind the adoption of procedural hybrids according to policies that can be
cited as undoubtedly politically expedient in character. This was clearly reflected in the
build up to POCA by then—Prime Minister Tony Blair, who in September 1999 stated that
‘we want to ensure that crime doesn’t pay. Seizing criminal assets deprives criminals and
criminal organisations of their financial lifeblood’ (Performance and Innovation Unit 2000:
13). Civil recovery is presented as a key strategy in the fight against serious crime. Initiated
as a result of perceived inadequacies of existing criminal processes in controlling high-
level and high-value organised crime, civil recovery enables the seizure of ‘criminal’
proceeds in the absence of a criminal conviction and on a reduced standard of proof.
This normative stance—that crime should not pay—is unlikely to prove particularly
controversial, or to give rise to much political contestation. If someone has committed a
criminal offence then that person should undoubtedly be denied the benefit of that offence.
It is when focus shifts to the mechanics of implementation, however, that concerns arise
(see Gledhill 2011: 81). This very issue is the second normative dimension of this analysis,
namely the tension created by the juxtaposition of the realisation of the stated policy goals
(see Performance and Innovation Unit 2000) with the requirements of due process, or,
rather, the apparent conflict between the goals of controlling high-level, high-value
criminal activity and ensuring the adequate observance of the alleged perpetrator’s civil
and political rights (Ivory 2014). This paper submits that, in their effective bypassing of
enhanced procedural protections, this hybrid measure is contrary to the rule of law and thus
lacking in necessary legitimacy (on the point that the legislative remedy of civil recovery
has gone too far in its attempt to remedy an existing inadequacy in the law, see Hendry and
King 2015). Although this critique may appear prima facie to be a legal-theoretical one, it
is important to note that this opens civil recovery up to challenge on the grounds that it
violates due process rights that are inherent in the criminal process.8
2 Legitimacy and the Rule of Law
Before we proceed with this argument, a number of concepts require further explicit
attention, not least that of legitimacy. Niklas Luhmann is not alone in despairing of the
concept of legitimacy (2004: 261),9 the myriad uses and conceptions of which mean it can
rightfully be considered an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1995), even if within
certain fields of study there does exist a tentative consensus.10 A concept perhaps more
familiar to politics than law, political legitimacy can be understood in a contractarian vein
as the popular acceptance of authority, typically an established system of democratic
Footnote 7 continued
POCA, although it can be viewed as a ‘parallel system […] of questionable justice’ to circumvent criminal
procedural protections (see Zedner 2009: 81) or a ‘shadow criminal justice system’ (Ferzan 2014: 517,
referring to the dissenting judgment of Stevens J in Allen v Illinois, 1986).
8 For consideration of political willingness to circumvent the criminal law, see MacDonald (2007:
616–618).
9 See opening quote above.
10 For example, international lawyers concern themselves with issues of legal authority, while public
lawyers focus upon the underlying democratic process, and criminologists often employ both normative and
sociological understandings. On legitimacy and why people obey the law, see, e.g., Tyler (2006a), Jackson
et al. (2012); on the ‘character’ of legitimacy, see, e.g., Bottoms and Tankebe (2012); on legitimacy in the
context of police cooperation, see, e.g., Hufnagel (in press).
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government according to the twin Lockean principles of consent of the governed and
majority rule. The contestation arises when we look beyond this basic conception and
attempt further specification or refinement, such as considering whether political legiti-
macy is premised upon descriptive or normative grounds, or whether it has procedural or
substantive requirements. Such arguments cannot be premised upon an objective foun-
dation but rather cite contingent political values. Indeed, if we shift our viewpoint to adopt
a more expressly legal perspective, then it becomes apparent that, while legitimacy is an
important concept for law, the task of furnishing it with content is one that rests not with
law, but with political and moral philosophy. The reason for this, as Weinberger (1999:
347, emphasis added) explains, is that:
Criteria of legitimacy are value-criteria which depend on philosophical and political
opinions. The criteria may concern the content of the law—this is the position of
natural law theorists—or they may postulate some forms of generation and/or some
kind of acceptance of the law as criteria of legitimacy. […] Legitimacy is not an
objective feature of valid law but a valuation based upon presupposed political
convictions. […] Legality of legal processes in the broad sense of the dynamic theory
of law is interpreted as a sign of legitimacy, but in fact the judgment about legitimacy
is distinct from the proof of legality.
This distinction is important for the purposes of this analysis, as it draws attention to the
way in which legitimacy is dependent on criteria that are markedly and essentially extra-
legal. Indeed, while legal theoretical discussions of the content, source(s), pedigree, or
reception of the law may inform (the selection of) such criteria, issues of legitimacy are
wholly separate from those of legal validity. In other words, while it is certainly possible to
establish legitimacy as a condition for or objective corollary of legality, this duty belongs
not to law but rather to politics. And this takes us to the crux of the matter, which is that
legitimacy can only be introduced to law through politics, a state of affairs that even in
democratic situations gives rise to undeniable contingency. The next section submits that
the vehicle of this introduction is the rule of law.
2.1 The Rule of Law
The rule of law is not a straightforward concept either to employ or to rely upon. As
Tamanaha (2004: 4) observes, the rule of law ‘stands in the peculiar state of being the
preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today, without agreement upon pre-
cisely what it means’. The textbook definition at least provides a starting point.
[T]he rule of law concerns the relationship of the government to the law [… It] is
both a legal rule and a political idea or principle of governance comprising values
that should be reflected in the legal system and should be respected by those con-
cerned in the making, development, interpretation and enforcement of the law.
(Turpin and Tomkins 2007: 76)
Immediately apparent within this definition is the concept’s duality. The rule of law is
simultaneously a legal rule and a value-laden political principle that is, importantly,
determinative of all aspects of law’s operation. More than this, however, is the manner by
which the rule of law embodies the law’s legitimacy, even although this legitimacy is
wholly contingent on the context of the political circumstances and indeed values at hand.
Legal legitimacy is thus a black-box concept—an empty vessel to be filled with animating
(political) values. The benefit of this is evident: by keeping any and all consideration of
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values separate from the legal, it precludes a slide back into well-worn debates on law’s
normativity or otherwise. While these foundational values can be both contingent and
indeterminate, their existence cannot be disputed; furthermore, their institutionalisation is a
vital dimension of their effectiveness. The rule of law in this regard ‘provides an insti-
tutional morality of rule-following, of rule formation, and of rule implementation and
interpretation, which speaks not so much to the content of jurisprudence, as to the way in
which they must be framed so as to sustain rather than subvert the moral basis of political
and legal order’ (Dyzenhaus 2001: 498). Also notable here is that this more procedurally
minded approach avoids drifting into normative matters by maintaining its focus on the
conditions of legal legitimacy, as opposed to its content.
To be clear here, we are required to separate out what Paul Craig in his seminal article
refers to as the formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law:
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the law was
promulgated (was it by a properly authorised person, in a properly authorised
manner, etc.); the clarity of the ensuing norm (was it sufficiently clear to guide an
individual’s conduct so as to enable a person to plan his or her life, etc.); and the
temporal dimension of the enacted norm. (was it prospective or retrospective, etc.).
Formal conceptions of the rule of law do not however seek to pass judgment upon the
actual content of the law itself. They are not concerned with whether the law was in
that sense a good or a bad law, provided that the formal precepts of the rule of law
were themselves met. Those who espouse substantive conceptions of the rule of law
seek to go beyond this. They accept that the rule of law has the formal attributes
mentioned above, but they wish to take the doctrine further. Certain substantive
rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law. The concept is used as
the foundation for these rights, which are then used to distinguish between ‘‘good’’
laws, which comply with such rights, and ‘‘bad’’ laws which do not. (Craig 1997:
467)
In terms of this dichotomy, our analysis focuses explicitly upon the rule of law’s formal
conception with specific reference to its procedural dimension; although formal concep-
tions of the rule of law can be premised upon abstract substantive moral considerations, it
is nonetheless quite a leap to make the rule of law co-extant with specifically articulated
substantive provisions (Craig 1997: 481–482, critiquing Allen 1993: 46). Whereas the rule
of law is recognised as comprising a ‘whole set of normative aspirations and quality
benchmarks’ (Nickel 2006: 169), the normative content of these benchmarks necessarily
remains always-already undetermined. Although it cannot be denied that ‘the formal
conception of the rule of law, and the desire to keep legal questions separate from broader
uses of political theory in deciding what the context of the law is, fit naturally together’
(Craig 1997: 477), it is as a particular result of both this paper’s reliance upon systems
theory, inherently positivist in its scope and ambit,11 and its focus upon procedural con-
siderations that this approach is adopted.
2.2 Systems Theory: Closure, Coding and Structural Coupling
Some of the main tenets of systems theory—that is, the theory of autopoietic social
systems as developed by Luhmann (see, for example, Luhmann
11 It would be counterintuitive to engage with substantive (value) considerations and then endeavour to
accommodate these within a systems-theoretical analysis.
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1985, 1995, 2004, 2012, 2013) and elaborated upon extensively by Gunther Teubner (see
1993, 1998, 2006)—should be introduced and explained at this point. According to Luh-
mann, modernity marked the arrival of societal differentiation on the basis of function. In
contrast to the segmentary and stratified pre-modern forms of social ordering, modern
society is decentred in the form of multiple self-referential function systems, such as law,
politics, the economy, religion, science, family, education, art, and so on. Such differen-
tiation generates stability within the social sphere by creating ‘broad-ranging societal
conditions of liberty, pluralism and autonomy, which are usually construed as the features
and pre-conditions of political democracy’ (Thornhill 2006: 89).12 Each social system has
a different function: while the function of the legal system within society can be estab-
lished as the stabilisation of normative expectations over time, including the production
and maintenance of counterfactual expectations in the face of their repeated disappoint-
ment, the economic system regulates scarcity by meeting future needs for material goods
(Beckert 2009: 212), and the political system provides the conditions for the exercise of
power.13
The relation between function and environment is, as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mi-
halopoulos (2010: 68) points out, one of ‘complexity reduction.’ A system distinguishes
itself from its environment, which comprises all other systems excluding itself, by drawing
a distinction between those communications that are relevant to it with reference to its own
binary coding. For example, while the unitary legal system communicates in terms of
lawful/unlawful, politics relies upon the binaries of government/opposition and govern-
ment/governed, science on the code true/false, and the economic system employs payment/
non-payment.14 Meaning is, therefore, system-specific—indeed, it is a core feature of
autopoietic communication that information does not cross from environment to system
but is rather internally constructed by the system. Not only does this construction of a
systemic boundary according to the system/environment distinction facilitate both the
system’s autonomy and operational closure, it also enables the system to ignore those
communications15 as irrelevant to its own operations, and thus to reduce complexity.
In Luhmann’s description of the operation of systems, communications are systemic
elements that produce and reproduce themselves and their environment. Communication
occurs ‘by splitting reality through a highly artificial distinction between utterance [the
condition of self-reference] and information [external reference], both taken as contingent
events within an ongoing process that recursively uses the results of previous steps and
anticipates further ones’ (Luhmann 1992: 1424). Every system operates recursively with
and in terms of communications that are meaningful to it—political communications, legal
communications, and so on—thus maintaining its own self-reference. Through this dis-
tinction between the utterance and the information within a communication, meaning
becomes the ‘simultaneous presentation… of actuality and possibility’ (Luhmann 2002:
12 The full quotation reads: ‘[O]ne characteristic of the functionally differentiated reality of modern society
is that it tends to be democratic. […] A political system is unlikely to make its contingency plausible
(legitimate) if it fails to reflect and respond to the plural and differentiated reality of democratic societies’.
13 These ‘functions’ are the ‘constitutive symbols’ of function systems. See Stichweh (2011: 44).
14 Indeed, this separation of the legal from any considerations of morality is often cited as an example of
systems theory’s innate positivism.
15 Rather than using actions as systemic elements, Luhmann employed communications, the effect of which
was to exclude the individual, with the result that his theory is often considered to be anti-humanist (see
Hendry and King 2015: 403).
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83),16 which is to say that the system’s cognitive openness to its environment remains in
accordance with the originary distinction of its binary code, the system-internal structure
that determines connection and attribution (Luhmann 1992: 1428).
Despite their operational closure, autonomy, and self-reference, however, different
systems can become ‘structurally coupled.’ Systems are structurally coupled when they
presuppose certain features of their environment on an ongoing basis and rely upon these
structurally (Luhmann 2004: 382). By way of illustration, we can point to the national
constitution as a coupling between the systems of law and politics, taxation as structurally
connecting the political and the economic systems, and both contracts and property as
couplings between the economic and legal systems. Importantly, these couplings are
neither interactions nor intersections but rather involve simultaneous, analogical coordi-
nation (Luhmann 1992: 1432) whereby these structures become ‘co-evolutionary without
becoming common’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 132). When systems are struc-
turally coupled, mutual perturbations and irritations17 occur that influence systemic
structural development—a system’s ‘cognitive openness’ facilitates the coordination of a
system’s ongoing self-referential processes with those occurring in its environment
(Luhmann 1987: 20).
It is as such a structural coupling between the legal and political systems that we
conceptualise the rule of law. Indeed, a closer look at its role makes this more readily
apparent because, as defined above, the rule of law is simultaneously ‘a legal rule and a
political idea’, establishing standards that ought to be applied and maintained within both
function systems (Turpin and Tomkins 2007: 76). Even under the formal definition as
outlined by Craig (1997), the rule of law comprises law’s creation, promulgation, and
application, including certain procedural standards and limitations18; as such it can be
understood systems-theoretically as establishing a contingent connection between the two
function systems of politics and law in the form of mutually constituted procedural
thresholds and requirements.19 This conception of the rule of law is further informed by the
distinction that systems theory draws between ideas of legitimacy and validity, or, rather,
the ease with which it distinguishes the latter compared to the difficulties it experiences
with the former. Their juxtaposition sets these issues in sharper relief.
2.3 Validity and Legitimacy in Systems Theory
Validity is the marker for the unity of the legal system and thus, as the symbol of the
autopoiesis of its communications, the closest the legal system comes to a self-description
of its operative function (Luhmann 2004: 122–123). In a passage reminiscent of HLA
Hart’s positivist position regarding the justiciability of the rule of recognition, Luhmann
(2004: 125) states that: ‘All law is valid law. Law which is not valid is not law. It follows
that the rule that makes validity recognizable cannot be one of the valid rules. There cannot
be any rule in the system that regulates the applicability/non-applicability of all the rules of
the system’. It is in this manner that the legal system organises its own closure and
16 See also Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2010: 108–109), who clarifies that meaning brings together ‘the
actuality of the system with the possibility of the environment.’
17 Systemic irritations are the system’s recognition, on its own terms and according to its own logic, of
communicative events in its environment. See Teubner (1998).
18 As outlined by Lord Steyn in Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson (1998: para.
591), the rule of law ‘enforces minimum standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural’.
19 This is discussed in more detail in the final section.
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functioning, premised upon the distinction between external reference and self-reference.
Legal validity is the application of the coding lawful/unlawful to systemic operations and
the means by which the legal system reproduces normative expectations with reference to
normative expectations (Luhmann 1992: 1427). As a legal-systemic eigen-value—namely,
a value constituted by the ‘recursive performance of the systems’ own operations […
which] cannot be used anywhere else’ (Luhmann 2004: 124)—validity itself is, impor-
tantly, without either intrinsic value (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 83) or its own
normativity (Hendry and King 2015: 407).
Legitimacy, by contrast, is a far less straightforward notion for the legal system to
accommodate. Indeed, Luhmann’s core explanation of legal legitimacy is remarkably
arcane: he describes the structure of the legitimacy of law as ‘a mixture of the cognitive/
normative expectation of normative expectation of cognitive expectation of normative
expectation’ (Luhmann 1985: 204). His emphasis is on the unavoidable contingency of
legal validity—in light of the lack of a foundational moment, positivist source, or tran-
scendent value upon which to rely, the law must resort to ‘legitimising itself through the
concept of validity’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 87). Yet the law’s very posi-
tivisation means that, for the legal system, validity is nothing other than the re-production
and re-entry20 (Teubner 2009: 11; Luhmann 2004: 105) of law’s difference into the system,
just as norms are nothing other than system-internal creations that provide it with necessary
decisional criteria. Systems theory thus appears to confirm what we already suspected,
namely that establishing legal legitimacy requires reliance upon a value relation that is
necessarily external to the legal system (Weinberger 1999: 347).
Most interesting, however, is Luhmann’s rejection of the classical idea that legitimacy
is the objective corollary of legality. Not only does he dismiss this position but he also
argues that legitimacy is, instead, the formula of contingency for politics. As Thornhill
(2006: 83) explains, ‘the legitimate political system is a political system which has woven
a convincing web of legitimacy out of its own, utterly contingent, operations’, and thus has
no need to rely on the legal for any constitutive input. The difference between the legal and
political systems here is striking: whereas the legal system is hamstrung by its own
inherent lack, the political system in effect behaves as if it were legitimate, creating
system-internal communications ex nihilo and ordering them in a manner both pre-
dictable and coherent. In this manner, it is subsequently able to rely upon such self-
reference to the extent that these systemic operations become externally meaningful
(Thornhill 2006: 82–83, 95), for example: the requirement of a specific margin for an
election victory, or the requirement for a referendum to underpin constitutional amend-
ment. The conditions under which political systems can claim legitimacy are hugely
variable and, moreover, arguably contextual as well as contingent. Similarly notable here is
the difference between Luhmann’s conception of political legitimacy and the Lockean
form cited earlier: although government is legitimate for Luhmann when its policies and
legislation are accepted as such by its citizens, there is no objective or substantive ‘content’
requirement for either the behaviour of that government or the substance of its policies that
determines its legitimacy in this regard. To the extent that political legitimacy is dependent
20 ‘Re-entry’ is the means by which the legal system observes its own operations. Originally coined by
George Spencer Brown (1972: 56, 69), Luhmann co-opts this term to denote the re-entry of the distinction
into what is distinguished, which is to say, the reintroduction of the system/environment distinction back
into the system. Re-entry allows for increased systemic self-awareness while also maintaining normative
closure.
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upon meeting conditions or attaining thresholds, these exist only insofar as they are
established by the political system as conditions upon its own operations.
And this is the rub. Since there are no pre-existing foundations upon which politics can
base its decisions, with the effect that it is required to conceive and construct ‘the con-
tingent parameters of its own legitimacy and so establish on its own the legal order which
supports its decisions’ (Thornhill 2006: 95), any substantive content or procedural
requirements operating as restrictions upon the operations of the political system must have
been, inescapably in this regard, deliberately selected as systemic self-limitations. Such
restraints are curbs upon the potential excesses not only of the political system, of course,
but also the legal system, which, by virtue of their structural coupling through the rule of
law, finds its operations and programmes subject to its own system-internal understanding
of these restrictions. This situation manifests within the legal system in the form of con-
ditional programming that regulates those procedures to which the system must adhere,
both at the level of passing legislation (see, e.g., Raz (1979) on the formal conception of
the rule of law and Fuller (1969) on a procedural understanding of law) and in terms of the
implementation of specific legislative provisions (see, e.g., Tyler 2006b). The function
systems are held in tension by their structural coupling—the rule of law—and as such are
each restricted by their own respective reconstructions of these limitations. Indeed, Lord
Woolf (1995: 68) conveyed the gist of this notion neatly when he stated: ‘As both Par-
liaments and the courts derive their authority from the rule of law so both are subject to it
and cannot act in a manner which involves its repudiation.’ Furthermore, these self-
imposed conditions of political legitimacy provide the necessary value-criteria upon which
the legal system’s operative validity unwittingly and yet fundamentally depends. Systems
theory’s positivist heritage shines through once more in the form of this ‘norm pyramid,’21
where the validity of a norm is premised upon the validity of a higher norm in the
hierarchy. Teubner (1997: 768) draws further attention to this issue in his own discussion
of law’s hierarchy of rules: the lower rules are legitimated by higher ones, the highest of all
being the nation state constitution, which establishes ‘democratic political legislation as the
ultimate legitimation of legal validity’.
This returns us to our core investigation, namely, whether legislative provisions prop-
erly enacted can ever lack legitimacy. We submit that this can be the case where such
provisions fail to comply with the rule of law, understood in the formal sense of the term,
and argue this position employing the example of civil/criminal procedural hybrids in
general, and the case study of civil recovery under POCA 2002 in particular. The character
of and motivations behind civil/criminal procedural hybrids will be the focus of the next
section.
3 Civil/Criminal Procedural Hybrids
Many explanations for the adoption of hybridised processes to tackle essentially criminal
behaviour have been advanced (for discussion in relation to ASBOs, see Ashworth and
Zedner 2014: 78ff). First, it has been suggested that the criminal law alone is inadequate in
tackling certain forms of harm. A second, related, explanation is that there can be
21 This refers to Kelsen’s Stufenbau, founded upon the Grundnorm: ‘All norms whose validity can be traced
back to one and the same basic norm constitute a system of norms, a normative order. The basic norm is the
common source for the validity of all norms that belong to the same order—it is their common reason of
validity.’ Kelsen (1967: 195). See n. 6 above.
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evidential benefits in resorting to civil processes, for example, the avoidance of the strict
application of the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings.22 Ashworth and Zedner (2014: 80)
draw attention to a third, more political, account: they note that many countries ‘have seen
a strain of penal populism in government statements and in legislative initiatives that are
often presented as measures of public protection’ (see Dzur 2012: 116). A fourth expla-
nation concerns policy transfer: civil measures have been used both in other jurisdictions
and in other areas of domestic law (Ashworth and Zedner 2014: 81–82). Uniting all of this
reasoning, however, is a sense of expediency—increasingly more common both within and
outwith the UK, procedural hybrids are being first introduced and then employed with
evident instrumentality. This paper not only queries the general legitimacy of such mea-
sures but uses the case study of civil recovery to illustrate their challenge to those rule of
law standards already discussed.23
The controversial civil recovery powers under Part 5 of POCA stemmed from concern
that those engaged in organised criminal activity (so-called ‘Mr Bigs’) were beyond the
reach of the criminal law; it was thought that the conventional approach of investigation,
prosecution, conviction, punishment was not working. The ‘solution’ was this civil
approach to seizing ‘criminal’ property without the need for criminal conviction and on the
civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities. There are many arguments advanced
in favour of using a non-conviction based approach to seizing assets, including (1) to take
the profit out of crime; (2) to disgorge property acquired through criminal acts; (3) to act as
a deterrent; (4) to deprive wrongdoers of financial resources for future criminal activity,
thereby acting as a form of prevention; (5) to disrupt criminal organisations; (6) to enable
property to be restored to victims of crime; (7) to protect the community and to demon-
strate that law enforcement is making efforts to tackle crime; and (8) to encourage
cooperation between different law enforcement agencies (primarily through
‘equitable sharing’ or ‘incentivisation’) (see Cassella 2013: 99). Proponents of civil
recovery contend that it is a civil process and, as such, does not require criminal procedural
protections, that civil recovery operates in rem (against the property) rather than in per-
sonam (against the individual). Proponents also claim that civil recovery represents a
necessary, proportionate response to growth in organised crime. It is often claimed that
civil recovery abides by all human rights norms and, furthermore, that there are in-built
safeguards to offer protection against abuse (see, for example, Cassella 2013, 2008;
Cassidy 2009; Simser 2009; Kennedy 2005).24 As we will argue, the courts have been
overly acquiescent in accepting such claims.
The adoption of civil recovery in the UK followed in the footsteps of other jurisdictions
that already had similar powers (see Kennedy 2006), but resort to civil law tools to tackle
criminal activity was not a new phenomenon in the UK—as outlined at the outset of this
article, the UK government has a long history of using civil tools in this manner. Zedner
22 In criminal proceedings, the hearsay rule was amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003; the provisions
of that legislation were recently considered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights:
see de Wilde (2013).
23 We focus on civil recovery powers in the UK, however, the same points could be made about similar
schemes elsewhere (whether called ‘civil recovery,’ ‘civil forfeiture,’ ‘non conviction based asset confis-
cation,’ or something else). As Kennedy (2005: 9) states, ‘[a]lthough pioneered in the USA, there now
appears to be a global trend to use stand-along civil proceedings as a means of recovering the proceeds of
crime’. There is an extensive literature on such powers in different jurisdictions, including the US (e.g.,
Nelson 2016), Canada (e.g., Gallant 2014), Australia (e.g., Gray 2012), Italy (e.g., Panzavolta and Flor
2015), Bulgaria (e.g., Dzhekova 2014), Romania (e.g., Nicolae 2013), to name a few.
24 For counterarguments, see the literature cited in n. 23.
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(2009: 81) discusses civil preventive measures which ‘circumvent the protections of the
criminal process by operating in parallel systems of questionable justice: according to the
less exacting requirements of the civil process or enforced via hybrid systems in which
breach of civil orders result in criminal sanctions’. Although her discussion concerned civil
orders such as ASBOs, control orders, and serious crime prevention orders,25 a similar
complaint can be made in relation to civil recovery under POCA. While there is no threat
of imprisonment, civil recovery orders permit deprivation of property in civil proceedings
on the grounds that that property constitutes proceeds of crime—another example of a
‘parallel system […] of questionable justice’ to circumvent criminal procedural
protections.
3.1 Civil Recovery and POCA 2002
POCA 2002 was introduced specifically to remedy perceived failures of existing criminal
justice processes in tackling serious and organised crime. Most problematic in this regard is
the supposedly hierarchical structure26 of such criminal activity, where:
[M]any major criminal figures have become untouchable by criminal prosecution.
They organise or finance the criminal activity of others and profit from the results,
but remain remote from the commission of particular crimes. That often makes it
impossible for law enforcement authorities to build a case against them. (Proceeds of
Crime Bill, HC Deb, 30 October 2001, vol. 373, c. 760, per Minister Denham)
It is this remoteness from the ‘coal-face’ that causes most difficulties for conventional law
enforcement. Where organised crime syndicates do operate hierarchically, the main
beneficiaries (i.e., the ‘organisers’) of their activities are said to be insulated against
successful police investigation, prosecution, and conviction. What is highlighted here are
the perceived inadequacies of conventional criminal justice tools in coping with
hierarchically organised criminal activity, and the extent of the problems allegedly27
faced by law enforcement. Indeed, when one considers that it is the primary function of the
legal system to ‘establish and stabilize societal expectations through the handling of
disappointment’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 71; Luhmann 1985, 2004) and thus
to provide constancy within society, this supposed ‘failure’ of the criminal law has the
same effect as a genuine failure. What, then, is the legal system to do in such a situation?
The options available are made clearer by considering further the idea of legal-systemic
expectations.
The legal system relies upon expectations as a means of controlling normativity,
reducing complexity, and eliminating contingency. Expectations are generated on the basis
of norms that, even in the event of their disappointment, remain unaffected—in this
manner, existing normative expectations are stabilised on a counterfactual basis. This is a
particularly familiar situation within the field of criminal law where, for example, criminal
25 Such orders are ‘hybrid civil-criminal orders that impose considerable restrictions set under a civil order
made in civil proceedings, breach of which constitutes a criminal offence with a penalty of up to 5 years’
imprisonment’ (Zedner 2009: 82).
26 Much of the political discourse surrounding the Proceeds of Crime Bill proceeded on the assumption that
organised crime groups operate on a hierarchical structure. Of course, not all organised criminal activity will
operate in such a structure, though that is outside the scope of this paper. For discussion of the structure of
organised crime groups, see, for example, Alach (2011); Spapens (2010).
27 As evidenced in the political discourse, the widespread political view was that existing criminal law tools
were ineffective, although it is difficult to say with certainty whether this was in fact the case.
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behaviour ought to be subject to legal sanction, wrongdoers ought to be punished, crime
should not pay, and so on. In spite of their repeated disappointment, these normative
expectations stay stable, and illegal conduct remains exactly that. Although necessary in
terms of reducing complexity by limiting the number of possible selections generated by
conditions of uncertainty, the effect of this systemic normative closure is that disap-
pointments do not lead to the legal system learning from its previous operations. For
systemic learning to occur, the legal system is instead reliant on its cognitive expectations,
which is to say, on its openness to changing factual conditions within society. It is through
this cognitive openness that the law is able to adapt—the legal system’s programming
adjusts both to deal with changes in its environment and to become more successful in the
realisation of its primary function. Such programming is guidance for the operation of the
system’s binary coding; it stipulates the conditions under which the coding lawful/unlawful
can be applied, and is the means by which the legal system modifies itself to recognise that,
for example, something that was lawful is now unlawful, or vice versa.
In this regard, the introduction of these hybrid civil recovery powers can be understood
as an endeavour to stabilise the normative expectation that the legal system will counteract
and ‘punish’28 criminal and thus illegal activity within society. At the same time, however,
and through the new procedures introduced, the legislation adjusts the system-internal
programming that guides the lawful/unlawful distinction. This situation results directly
from the criminal law’s perceived inadequacy to deal with the particular challenges of
serious and organised crime: the importance of this attrition in terms of the law’s self-
regulation cannot be overstated. This alleged failure of law, this apparently continuing
disappointment of its normative expectation over time, was what gave rise to these
wholesale procedural changes. In its adoption of such a hybrid approach, we see the
supposed failure of law being concretised through procedure (Hendry and King 2015).
The next section scrutinises the jurisprudence of civil recovery and analyses the effects
of these in rem measures. At this juncture, however, it is worth emphasising the following:
as a criminal justice strategy, civil recovery is overtly normative in its stance that criminal
activity should not pay, is instrumentally engaged in undermining the profit incentive of
organised criminal behaviour, and—by using civil rather than criminal procedures—de-
liberately prioritises this motive over compliance with procedural safeguards inherent to
the criminal process in the UK.
3.2 Civil Recovery in the Courts
As the primary legislation providing for asset recovery, POCA makes provision for both
post-conviction confiscation of assets (POCA, Parts 2–4) and non-conviction based con-
fiscation of the proceeds of unlawful conduct, labelled ‘civil recovery’ (Part 5).29 Despite
our focus resting upon the latter, distinguishing the two forms is vital: while actions under
civil recovery (POCA, Part 5) do not require a criminal conviction, it is only subsequent to
a conviction that a confiscation order (POCA, Parts 2–4) can be made. With such a post-
conviction confiscation order, all of the enhanced procedural protections of the criminal
28 For discussion of civil penalties, see White (2010).
29 This legislation uses the term ‘civil recovery’ to describe its non-conviction based asset recovery powers.
In other jurisdictions, different terms are often used, including ‘civil forfeiture,’ ‘non-conviction based asset
forfeiture,’ and ‘non-conviction based confiscation’ to give a few examples. Part 5 of POCA also contains
provision for cash forfeiture under s. 298. While our discussion here is concerned with macro issues
concerning civil recovery (and procedural hybrids, more generally), the same concern might also be
expressed in relation to cash forfeiture absent criminal conviction.
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process apply at the criminal trial, including the presumption of innocence, the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and exclusionary rules of evidence, for example, the rule
against hearsay. It is only post-conviction, at the confiscation hearing, that the standard of
proof employed is the civil one—the balance of probabilities—and there the rules of
evidence are akin to those in a sentencing hearing (Alldridge 2014a: 173–174). By con-
trast, a civil recovery order can be granted even in the absence of criminal conviction, and
‘whether or not any proceedings have been brought for an offence in connection with the
property’ (POCA, s. 240(2)), including instances where defendants have been acquitted in
criminal proceedings (Taher 2006)30 or even where a conviction has been quashed (Olden
2010). The civil rules of evidence apply, meaning that both character and hearsay evidence
can be admitted, as can evidence obtained by improper means (Olden 2010), and the
standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities (POCA, s. 241(3)). Finally, a confiscation
order operates in personam, while a civil recovery order operates in rem.
Part 5 of POCA enables the ‘enforcement authority’ to recover, in civil proceedings,
property that is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct (POCA, s.
240).31 Given the perceived inadequacies of existing criminal legal processes and the
attendant difficulties in securing criminal conviction, post-conviction confiscation was
often impossible—the result of this was that the benefits of non-conviction-based
approaches in this purely instrumental regard were increasingly proclaimed. Nevertheless,
and although these processes have made strides in terms of efficacy, it is hard not to rue
their introduction as a privileging of instrumentality over considerations of due process, not
least because there are manifest reasons for the enhanced procedural safeguards inherent in
the criminal process. As Roberts and Zuckerman (2010: 247) articulate in relation to the
heightened standard of proof, ‘[t]his asymmetrical standard is not a natural or
inevitable incident of allocating probative burdens; it is, rather, an additional commitment,
over and above requiring the prosecution to prove guilt, to the presumption of innocence
and its animating liberal philosophy of respect for persons’. By requiring this elevated
standard of proof, the criminal process establishes itself as innately risk-averse,32 with a
wrongful conviction being perceived as far worse than a wrongful acquittal.33 Criminal
law’s ‘asymmetric standard’ can be considered, therefore, as a prophylactic measure
against an erroneous trial outcome (i.e., a false conviction) or, in systems-theoretical
language, a ‘bulwark’ against systemic excess.34 We consider this, first, concerning the
‘civil’ nature of the proceedings under Part 5 of POCA and, second, in relation to those due
process concerns that arise as a result of this kind of hybridised procedure.
‘Civil’ and ‘criminal’ processes have traditionally been distinguished on the basis of a
variety of factors, including inter alia: subjective/objective culpability, harm, the role of a
prosecution authority, the extent of investigatory powers available to the State, evidential
30 This includes an acquittal in another jurisdiction: Namli and Topinvest Holdings International Ltd
(2013); Gale (2010).
31 In relation to cash forfeiture, s. 240(1)(b) goes further, providing that cash may be forfeited not only
where it has been obtained through unlawful conduct but also where the cash is intended to be used in such
conduct.
32 The term ‘risk-averse’ is used here in the sense of wanting to avoid risks as much as possible: see the
Cambridge English Dictionary. It is recognised, however, that there is always an element of risk in the
criminal process.
33 As the Blackstone Ratio provides: it is better that ten guilty people go free than for one innocent person to
be wrongly convicted. For discussion of the presumption of innocence, see Ashworth (2006); Campbell
(2013).
34 For a discussion of rights as curbs upon systemic excess, see Verschraegen (2002: 262).
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rules, punishment, and stigma (see Hall 1943; Ashworth 2000). Far from being a mere
semantic distinction, in practice it means that while ‘civil’ processes operate under lesser
burdens, processes designated as ‘criminal’ attract for the accused enhanced procedural
protections as additional commitments. Civil recovery, as the name suggests, purports to be
a civil process and, importantly, has been held not to be of a criminal character35 in spite of
its ‘potential for use as an uneasy and unsatisfactory substitute for the criminal process’
(Rees et al. 2011: para. 6.13). Indeed, the courts have been consistent on this position.
Perhaps the leading case on this issue is Walsh where, on considering whether such
proceedings are criminal for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR,36 both Coghlin J (Re
the Director of the Assets Recovery Agency, 2004) and the Court of Appeal (Walsh 2005)
concluded that civil recovery proceedings under Part 5 of POCA should be classified as
civil proceedings.37 The three criteria established by the Strasbourg Court in Engel
(1979–80) were: the domestic classification of the proceedings at issue, the nature of the
offence in question, and the nature and severity of the penalty that may be imposed.
Applying these criteria, it was held that:
[A]ll the available indicators point strongly to this case being classified in the
national law as a form of civil proceeding. The appellant is not charged with a crime.
Although it must be shown that he was guilty of unlawful conduct in the sense that he
has acted contrary to the criminal law, this is not for the purpose of making him
amenable as he would be if he had been convicted of crime. He is not liable to
imprisonment or fine if the recovery action succeeds. There is no indictment and no
verdict. The primary purpose of the legislation is restitutionary rather than penal.
(Walsh 2005: para. 27 (per Kerr LCJ delivering the judgment of the court))
Similar considerations applied in relation to the second Engel criterion, with Kerr LCJ
stating:
The allegation made against the appellant does not impute guilt of a specific offence;
the proceedings do not seek to impose a penalty other than the recovery of assets
acquired through criminal conduct; and they are initiated by the director of an
agency, which, although it is a public authority, has no prosecutorial function or
competence. (ibid: para. 29)
The final criterion was also dealt with rather dismissively, with civil recovery being
described as a preventative measure: ‘After all, the person who is required to yield up the
assets does no more than return what he obtained illegally.’ (ibid: para. 38) Kerr LCJ also
dismissed the argument that, viewed cumulatively, the Engel criteria ought to result in civil
recovery being held as criminal in character:
The essence of Art 6 in its criminal dimension is the charging of a person with a
criminal offence for the purpose of securing a conviction with a view to exposing
that person to criminal sanction. These proceedings are obviously and significantly
different from that type of application. They are not directed towards him in the
sense that they seek to inflict punishment beyond the recovery of assets that do not
35 This stance has, however, been widely criticised. See, e.g., Campbell (2010), King (2012).
36 See Engel (1979–80: para. 82). For discussion in the context of non-conviction based asset recovery, see
King (2014), Boucht (2014). The criteria set out in Engel are open to criticism, however: for consideration in
the context of civil recovery, see Alldridge (2014b).
37 Numerous other judgments have upheld the civil nature of proceedings under Part 5, including: Jia Jin
He and Dan Dan Chen, 2004; Commissioners of Customs and Excise, 2005; Gale, 2011.
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lawfully belong to him. As such, while they will obviously have an impact on the
appellant, these are predominantly proceedings in rem. They are designed to recover
the proceeds of crime, rather than to establish, in the context of criminal proceedings,
guilt of specific offences. The cumulative effect of the application of the tests in
Engel is to identify these clearly as civil proceedings. (ibid: para. 41)
The robustness of this judicial position is disconcerting, however, not least because, in
spite of civil recovery’s adoption of civil processes, it is still evidently concerned with
allegations of criminal wrongdoing.38 We say ‘evidently’ because, revisiting the under-
lying policy, the stated aim in introducing civil recovery was for it to be a more effective
tool in dealing with ‘criminal Mr Bigs’ (Proceeds of Crime Bill, HC Deb, 30 October
2001, vol. 373, c. 803, per Mr McCabe). That there was a clear punitive purpose under-
pinning this draconian power is simply undeniable.39 In applying the Engel criteria to civil
recovery under Part 5 of POCA, the UK courts appear to have failed to recognise what civil
recovery actually is, which is to say, a wholly instrumental approach conceived to employ
civil law processes in pursuing criminal law objectives, and to circumvent those procedural
safeguards that inhere in a criminal trial. This is deeply unsatisfactory on two counts. First,
the courts over-rely upon the first limb of the Engel test, itself not decisive—however
much the legislative intent was to design a civil procedure, this alone is insufficient (O¨zturk
1984; also Trechsel 2005: 18). We must instead consider what was actually created:
intention does not dictate substance (King 2012: 347). In their overly deferential stance
regarding the legislative label ‘civil,’ the courts have clearly failed to ensure the adequate
protection of individual rights. Second, it is the duty of the courts to scrutinise the beha-
viour of Parliament and prevent the excessive exercise of political power. We submit that
the application of a civil label to a criminal procedure, and the resultant erosion of due
process rights and standards that would apply in the event that ‘civil’ recovery were to be
properly regarded as a criminal procedure, constitutes such an excessive exercise of power.
Furthermore, this can be framed specifically in terms of the rule of law: as Lord Woolf
(1995: 68) stated, ‘ultimately there are limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is
the courts’ inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold’. Due process rights safeguard
against systemic excess, and their maintenance and application is the task of the courts; this
critique is elaborated upon in the final section.
The second and third Engel criteria provide further avenues for critique. Kerr LCJ is
correct to say in terms of the second criterion that civil recovery proceedings do ‘not
impute guilt of a specific offence’ (Walsh 2005: para. 29). They do, however, allow the
State to make general allegations of criminality,40 a lack of specificity that simply would
not suffice in criminal proceedings. As for the third and final limb, and in spite of the
emphasis resting on the ‘proceeds of crime,’ while civil recovery is presented as recouping
ill-gotten gains, in essence it operates as a sanction on criminal wrongdoing. Focusing
38 For an example of civil recovery in practice, see the detailed judgment of Griffith Williams J in Gale
(2009).
39 This punitive purpose is illustrated in the words of Lord Rooker: ‘many major criminal figures have
become untouchable by prosecution and confiscation. They organise or finance the criminal activity of
others and then profit from the results. Subsequently, they are subject to our current processes, but, as I said,
are almost untouchable. In many such cases, law enforcement has compelling evidence that assets were
derived by unlawful activity. That evidence is often supplemented by evidence that property has been
concealed, or by the absence of any rational explanation for the legitimacy of a person’s assets. The Bill
addresses that key issue.’ Proceeds of Crime Bill, HL Deb, 25 March 2002, vol. 633 c. 13.
40 See Olupitan (2008: para. 22).
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merely on the return of illegal gains without recognising the full implications of the civil
recovery order is trite—an individual subject to such an order will not only suffer depri-
vation of his/her assets but the label and stigma of being a ‘criminal,’ if not in law, then at
least in the eyes of his/her fellow citizens.41 To suggest that under such circumstances the
individual is not being punished, that there is no imputation of criminal liability, and that in
rem civil recovery proceedings concentrate solely on property, is to be entirely disin-
genuous about what civil recovery entails.42
3.3 The Utility of a Systems-Theoretical Perspective
While the designation of the civil recovery hybrid procedure as either criminal or civil is,
as we have argued, a problematic one for the UK courts, systems theory encounters no such
problems; on the contrary, it accommodates this distinction with ease. This can be credited
to the manner by which the legal system’s binary code ascertains the relevance or other-
wise of societal communications and distinguishes them system-internally. The civil/
criminal dichotomy is encompassed by the systemic code lawful/unlawful, and thus is
included within the unity of the legal system—it is only once the communication has been
deemed of relevance to the legal system that further systemic programmes are required to
distinguish between these values. As Luhmann explains: ‘Since the values legal and illegal
are not in themselves criteria for the decision between legal and illegal, there must be
further points of view that indicate whether or not and how the values of a code are to be
allocated, rightly or wrongly’ (Luhmann 2004: 192). Programmes, as system-internal
semantic elements, are the ‘vehicles of connection between the code and the world-at-
large’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 74), and operate by linking self-reference with
external reference.
It is within such programmes that rules of procedure are situated in the legal system.
Their charge in this regard is the recursive application of norms to the application of norms
(Luhmann 2004: 158), with all of these operations being undertaken to realise the legal
system’s primary function, that is, the stabilisation of normative expectations over time.
This can be articulated in terms of our case study: when existing strategies of criminal law
enforcement were deemed unfit for the purpose of tackling the complexities of organised
crime, the introduction of civil recovery via POCA 2002 was a direct reaction to the
disappointment of the normative expectation that crime should not pay. That is not to say
that the autopoietic legal system engages at any point with issues of either the moral
content of the law or the policy motivations for legislative change—there is no consid-
eration, for example, of the crime control ideology underpinning ‘follow-the-money’
approaches, or the overt political and normative instrumentality of civil recovery, indeed
there could not be. No, where civil recovery has brought about a restructuring of legal
systemic programming and, in turn, a reorientation of its rules of criminal and civil pro-
cedure, the system itself is only aware of these as system-internal reactions to the repeated
disappointment of its normative expectations. Moreover, by virtue of its inclusion within
the unity of the legal system, civil recovery accords to the systemic eigen-value of validity.
41 E.g., National Crime Agency (May 1, 2015) North-west organised crime suspect loses family home
[press release]. Available at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/613-north-west-organised-
crime-suspect-loses-family-home (Last accessed June 25, 2016).
42 For consideration of procedural protections in the context of civil preventive measures, see Ferzan
(2014).
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It is, however, not about the legal validity of a practice that sees a civil standard of proof
employed within a criminal mechanism that we have reservations. Rather, we query the
legitimacy of civil recovery with specific reference to those procedural standards contained
within the rule of law that, we argue, are being eroded by the disastrous combination of
legislative excess in implementing POCA and the subsequent judicial failure to protect
individual due process rights in the courts.
4 Procedural hybridity and due process
The statement concluding the previous section is a robust one and, as such, requires both
explanation and justification. The final section of this paper argues —in relation to the idea
of the (formally conceived) rule of law as structural coupling—that due process rights
comprise those minimal procedural standards that politics and law are required to uphold,
and that these contingent values serve to connect legal and political legitimacy. In
establishing this, we examine the attrition by civil/criminal hybridised measures of those
enhanced procedural protections normally applicable at a criminal trial, and consider
systemic self-limitations with reference to the concept of legitimacy.
4.1 Due Process Rights
Where an individual is charged with a criminal offence, enhanced procedural protections
come into play. Although some of these entitlements span both criminal and civil pro-
ceedings,43 certain supplementary protections are only applicable where a person is
charged with a criminal offence.44 The objective of these additional safeguards is the
provision of ‘fundamental guarantees against arbitrary State conduct and [the] potential
misuse of its authority, an authority that is considerable when the public censure of
conviction and State punishment are at stake’ (Ashworth and Redmayne 2010: 403–404).
Duff et al. (2007: 5) point out: ‘Defendants have various rights which must be protected,
partly in order to ensure that verdicts are accurate, but also to ensure that accurate verdicts
are sought with a proper degree of respect for the defendant as a citizen.’ These twin
motivations appear conspicuously aware of the power asymmetries at play when an
individual citizen is exposed to the might of the State’s criminal justice apparatus, and of
the potential for the State to act arbitrarily if not subject to restriction. It is worth noting
here that these restrictions upon State power are ones it has imposed upon itself through,
for example, becoming a signatory to the ECHR, or upholding its rule of law.
This reasoning holds similarly true under a systems analysis, where rights are conceived
as the means by which society guards against the dangers of de-differentiation45 and
systemic excess. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2010: 154) explains, ‘rights are both
the result and the precondition of political systemic formation and generally social
43 Article 6(1) ECHR: such as a fair and public hearing; an independent and impartial tribunal; a reasonable
timeframe; etc.
44 Articles 6(2)-(3) ECHR: such as the presumption of innocence (Art. 6(2)) and the right to confront
witnesses (Art. 6(3)(d)).
45 Whereas structural coupling is of mutual benefit to coupled systems and, by that token, to society as a
whole, de-differentiation or ‘increased approximation’ describes the negative situation where systems inhibit
one another to the extent of interfering with the abilities of each to carry out their own operations. See
Nobles and Schiff, 2012: ch. 7.
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differentiation. They consolidate the limits between systems while at the same time are
guaranteed by the existence of those very limits’. By conceptualising procedural rights as
self-imposed restraints upon systemic operations in this manner, it becomes easier to
perceive the problem generated by their circumvention through civil recovery measures.
Indeed, the very real concerns that the purportedly ‘civil’ nature of these proceedings raises
for individual due process and procedural rights can be illustrated by the following
example.
In criminal proceedings, the prosecution must establish guilt to the criminal standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt (there is extensive literature on the underlying rationale:
recent examples in this journal include Ferzan 2014; Lippke 2014; Stewart 2014 Stuck-
enberg 2014; Tadros 2014; Weigend 2014). To return here to our civil recovery case study,
in proceedings under Part 5 of POCA, it is the civil standard—the balance of probabili-
ties—that applies for assets to be confiscated. Indeed, the legislation is explicit in this
regard:
The court or sheriff must decide on a balance of probabilities whether it is proved:
(a) That any matters alleged to constitute unlawful conduct have occurred, or
(b) That any person intended to use any cash in unlawful conduct.46
In Jia Jin He and Dan Dan Chen (2004: para. 66) Collins J stated:
As a general rule, no doubt, criminal conduct may be regarded as less probable than
non-criminal conduct. But where there is evidence from which a court can be sat-
isfied that it is more probable than not that criminal conduct has been involved, it
does not seem to me that that is something that is so improbable as to require a gloss
on the standard of proof. However, I recognise, and it is no doubt right, that since it is
necessary to establish that there has been criminal conduct in the obtaining of the
property, the court should look for cogent evidence before deciding that the balance
of probabilities has been met. But I have no doubt that Parliament deliberately
referred to the balance of probabilities, and that the court should not place a gloss
upon it, so as to require that the standard approaches that appropriate in a criminal
case. Apart from anything else, if that were necessary, the effectiveness of, in par-
ticular, Part 5 of the Act would be to a considerable extent removed. Since it is clear
that Parliament intended that it should be used, even if criminal proceedings could
not be successfully instituted, it is plain that Parliament deliberately imposed a lower
standard of proof as the standard appropriate for these proceedings.
Civil recovery measures, as Kennedy (2006: 139) notes, were devised ‘to ensure that
respondents cannot argue that the central issue (whether the property is criminal proceeds)
ought properly to be proved to the criminal standard of proof’; here the instrumentality of
the legislation is strikingly apparent. Kerr LCJ further emphasised this in Walsh (2005:
para. 33), stating: ‘If recovery proceedings could only be taken on proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the person from whom recovery was sought had benefited from crime, the
efficacy of the system would be substantially compromised’.
Yet that is the crux of our criticism. Where the State is alleging that an individual has
benefited from criminal activity, it is difficult for a lower burden of proof than the criminal
46 POCA, s. 241(3), emphasis added. This was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gale (2011). The approach
in Gale was followed in Hymans (2011).
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standard of beyond reasonable doubt even to be countenanced.47 Nevertheless, counte-
nanced it is, and more: through Part 5 of POCA, efficiency is privileged over certainty and
due process safeguards are abandoned in the service of the legislative intent to ensure that
crime does not pay. Indeed, the lowering of the standard of proof makes it significantly
more straightforward to prove matters of both fact and law: ‘[e]ven a modest degree of
civil content introduced into the strategy, the trading of the criminal standard for the civil
standard of proof in the confiscation process, facilitates the task of realizing an attack on
the financial elements of crime’ (Gallant 2005: 19). More troubling still is the way in which
a person who has been subject to an unsuccessful criminal prosecution can nonetheless be
subject to subsequent proceedings under Part 5 of POCA48 (Taher 2006),49 or how civil
recovery proceedings can continue even after a criminal prosecution has been discontin-
ued. This was the case in Jia Jin He and Dan Dan Che (2004: para. 67), where in spite of
the decision not to prosecute—‘no doubt because it was considered that [criminal pro-
ceedings] would not succeed’—civil recovery proceedings were still permitted. Part 5
proceedings have even been successful in circumstances where the criminal case was
stayed as an abuse of process (Hymans 2011). This jurisprudence highlights the way in
which civil recovery, where criminal prosecution is either impossible or has been unsuc-
cessful, allows the State to take a second bite at the cherry. To be clear on this point: under
such proceedings the parties are the same (i.e., the State against the individual), the
allegations will often concern the same conduct, and the evidence can even be the same as
that relied upon in the unsuccessful criminal prosecution—the only salient difference is the
reduced standard of proof. These observations combine to indicate that civil recovery is an
express mechanism for State circumvention of those enhanced procedural protections
inherent to the criminal process.
The most bewildering aspect of this state of affairs, however, has been the willingness
of the courts to accept unchallenged the legislative label ‘civil’ for such proceedings,
particularly in light of the repercussions for due process and individual rights. Indeed,
considering that it is arguably the role of the courts to regulate the exercise of state power
with a view to ensuring its compliance with the rule of law (O’Cinneide 2009), this raises
the question: why, then, such an apparent reluctance to do so in terms of civil recovery?
Moreover, is this likely to be the case for all such procedural hybrids?
47 Our position is that civil recovery proceedings ought properly to be regarded as criminal proceedings, and
thus the criminal standard of proof ought to apply. Although it has been argued elsewhere that the State
could pursue civil proceedings in preference to a criminal prosecution, ‘procedural symmetry’ might be
warranted under circumstances where civil proceedings carry the trappings of the criminal process or speak
to the same sorts of concerns as would be dealt with in criminal proceedings: ‘what is crucial about
procedural symmetry claims is that they are extracted from claims about the relationship between the citizen
and the state. They are fundamentally questions about how the state should treat us, what stance it should
have toward us, and how procedural burdens should work in light of power imbalances. The state treats us
differently in different sorts of situations, and thus, we need to pay close attention to how preventive
interferences are similar to, and different from, the criminal process.’ See Ferzan (2014: 519–520).
48 Ferzan (2014: 519) contends that ‘this is not a PoI [presumption of innocence] objection: it is a concern
about the lack of preclusive effect of an acquittal.’ She goes on to say: ‘so long as the state opts for a
preventive mechanism, and not the criminal law, it can do so, irrespective of whether such a system
communicates some amount of censure. The criminal law does not have sole dibs on being a censuring
institution. However, to the extent that a preventive system does have some of the trappings of a criminal
institution, or speaks to the same sorts of concerns, procedural symmetry may be warranted.’ (2014: 519).
49 There is extensive ECHR jurisprudence on civil proceedings subsequent to an acquittal in criminal
proceedings. See, for example, Sekanina (1994); Leutscher (1997); Rushiti (2001); Y (2005); Ringvold
(2003); and Hammern (2003). These cases are discussed, in the context of asset recovery, in King (2014).
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4.2 Procedural Rights and the Rule of Law
In undertaking this analysis, we are mindful that our discussions of rights may intimate that
our conception of the rule of law has shifted from a formal to a more substantive one. This
is not so, and neither is it our intention to conflate the rule of law with the substance of
particular rules. That said, even the most formal and neutral conception of the rule of law
allows for the inclusion of legal-cultural dimensions: indeed, Raz has stated that ‘[i]n
insisting on the integration of legislation and other current measures with legal traditions
enshrined in doctrine, the rule of law respects those civil rights which are part of the
backbone of legal culture, part of its fundamental traditions’ (Raz 1994: 360). There are
three important points to take from this statement. First, the rule of law is undeniably
contingent upon its particular legal-cultural context. Second, in a marginally ‘thicker’
conception (Bingham 2011: 119) than perhaps usually expected from Raz, due process
civil rights fall squarely within the ambit of the rule of law, arguably due both to their
procedural character and their noted significance within the legal culture of the UK. In this
regard, the third and final point from Raz’s statement has particular salience, and that is his
insistence that not only is the rule of law so understood confined to democratic societies but
that such due process rights are in fact a condition of political democracy.50 He argues that
‘the law inevitably creates a great deal of arbitrary power [and] the rule of law is designed
to minimize the danger created by the law’ (Raz 1977: 206): within a democratic society,
the rule of law operates as a control on governmental power, intended to safeguard against
its excessive use or abuse. Not only are there clear similarities between this position and
the systems-theoretical understanding of rights as systemic self-limitations, but this priv-
ileging of political democracy is also evident in Luhmann, who considers it to be a vital
condition for the functional differentiation of modern society. Indeed, as Thornhill (2006:
89) explains, ‘a political system is unlikely to make its contingency plausible (legitimate) if
it fails to reflect and respond to the plural and differentiated reality of democratic soci-
eties’. Democracy can thus be cited as a condition of political legitimacy as much for a
systems-theoretical understanding as it is under a classically social-contractarian one.
What of legal legitimacy, however? Although we have presented it as a problematic
notion for a systems-theoretical construction, it is here elucidated through the existence
and operation of the structural coupling of the rule of law, a structural coupling that
operates to peg the legal system to those standards established by the political system. By
means of this coordinated structural link, political systemic limitations—namely, due
process rights—are extended to the legal system, wherein they embody value criteria
within the ‘black box’ of legal legitimacy. Although such due process rights are ‘a pivotal
part of the arsenal of values in the name of which the political system legitimises itself’
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 154), such rights act as a shield against the structural
violence created by unrestricted functional (de)differentiation, and this is true for all
function systems, not just the political. It is through a combination of such rights as
systemic limitations and the rule of law as a structural coupling between the political and
legal systems that we can understand legal legitimacy. Not sufficient simply to be legally
valid, legal legitimacy requires that the operations of the legal system are in accordance
both with those minimal limitations imposed upon it by the procedural rights that it itself
50 ‘This analysis presupposes the existence of such rights in that Raz’s present discussion of the rule of law
is confined to democratic societies, and a society cannot be democratic without the existence of such rights.’
See Craig (1997: 467).
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has recognised as legally valid, and in terms of the political values that serve to furnish the
content of the rule of law and structural coupling between the political and legal systems.
Our exemplification of this conundrum has relied upon the controversial provisions of
POCA 2002, and so will our conclusion. We asserted from the outset that hybridised
procedures in general, and civil recovery in particular, lack legal legitimacy, and we
maintain this position on two counts. POCA itself constitutes overt legislative overstepping
in its evasion of enhanced procedural rights protections, a situation then compounded by
the failure of the courts both in identifying this excess and in taking steps to prevent or
mitigate its effects. Such failures cannot but lead to the following conclusions: that civil
recovery provisions are lacking in necessary legitimacy—a situation that places the con-
tinued reliance upon such hybridised procedures into far sharper relief—and that the
instrumental and expedient circumvention of those procedural safeguards that usually
inhere in a criminal trial should be recognised as a very real concern in terms of civil
liberties within the UK.
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